公司治理与管理层机会主义会计选择——基于新会计准则的实证分析

Corporate Governance and Management's Opportunist Accounting Choice——Evidence from New Accounting Standard

2007年1月1日开始实施的新会计准则为上市公司提供了更多的会计选择空间,诱发了管理层的机会主义动机。本文以新会计准则下金融资产分类为例,结合2007～2008年中国A股上市公司数据,实证检验了公司治理安排对管理层机会主义会计选择的影响。研究发现,国家控股和两职合一的公司更倾向于机会主义会计选择,独立董事比例和管理层持股比例与机会主义会计选择显著负相关。并且,独立董事和股权激励制度对管理层机会主义会计行为的约束作用在国有企业中更加显著。本研究丰富了会计选择的研究文献,有助于监管部门了解新会计准则的实施效果及影响机制。

The new accounting standard implemented on January 1st, 2007, provides more accounting choice for listed firms. Based on the classification of financial assets under new accounting standard, this paper analyses the effect of corporate governance on management＇s accounting choice by using Chinese listed firms in 2007 to 2008 as research sample. We find that State-owned and CEO duality is positive correlative with opportunist accounting choice. Board independence and proportion of management ownership is negative correlative with opportunist accounting choice. Also, the governance effect of independent directors and management equity incentive is only significant in state-owned enterprises. This paper enriches the literature of accounting choice and can help governors to understand the mechanisms which affect the implementation of new accounting standard.