基于代理理论视角的总经理薪酬业绩敏感性研究——来自中国上市公司的证据

Research on Pay-Performance Sensitivity in Agency Theory Perspective——Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

本文选取2005—2008年深沪两市非金融类纯A股上市公司为样本,对影响总经理报酬业绩敏感性的影响因素进行分析。研究发现除股权性质外,公司规模、负债代理成本、收益风险、董事会治理、权力自利等五个特征均对业绩敏感性产生显著影响。其中,财务杠杆和收益风险与业绩敏感性负相关,符合经典代理理论的预测,说明我国薪酬契约的设计具有一定的有效性。

This paper selects non-financial listed companies between 2005—2008 as sample,and analyzes the factors affecting pay-performance sensitivity.We found that company size,debt agency costs,income risk,board governance and the nature of self-interest can have a significant impact on the manager＇s pay-performance sensitivity.The risk and financial leverage are negatively related to pay-performance sensitivity,which conform to the classical agency theory predicts.