煤炭企业安全生产管制多方博弈研究

Multi-game Analysis on the Regulating of Coal Mine Work Safety

为研究我国煤矿企业安全生产管制效果影响因素和管制力度相对不足的问题,构建中央政府、地方政府、煤矿企业和煤矿员工四方博弈模型。模型分析结果表明:地方政府对煤炭企业的监管效果受到企业预期损失、安全生产管理成本和中央政府给予举报者的奖金额的影响。从而,可以得出结论:大多数中小煤矿企业有其自发管理的动力,地方政府监管力度较低;企业需要改进管理方法,降低管理成本,合理制定员工事故赔偿额标准,降低员工的遵守规章的难度,并适度提高对员工遵守规章行为的奖励力度,以降低员工从事不安全生产行为的概率。

In order to study the regulating factors of coal mine work safety and the relatively poor regulations on it from government,a four-party game model composed of central government,local government,coal mine enterprise and coalmine staff is constructed.Analysis on the model shows that the local government＇s regulating effect on coal mine work safety is affected by enterprise＇s expected loss,safety management cost and the awards that central government offers to informers.Therefore,it could be concluded that,for most of the medium-sized and small coal mine enterprises,they have the motive power of spontaneous management,thus,the local government＇s regulating force is often low;The enterprises need trying their best to reduce the management cost,improve the method of management,establish a reasonable standard of accident compensation,reduce the difficulty of the employees abiding by rules,and moderately improve the force rewarding the employees abiding by rules,so as to reduce the probability of employees＇ unsafe behaviors.