不完全信息条件下象征式竞购合谋的均衡策略分析

Equilibrium Analysis of Complementary Takeover Collusion under Incomplete Information

研究象征式竞购合谋这种典型合谋方式的均衡策略问题。考虑到竞购双方估值信息的不完全,以拍卖理论中的竞标模型为基础,确定了合谋激励条件,求解了合理的利益补偿价值,并在此基础上通过博弈分析得出了竞购合谋的均衡策略,最后分析了目标公司针对竞购双方合谋在保留价格上的响应策略。研究表明,竞购者合谋并未降低收购活动的经济效益,目标公司能够通过设定合理的保留来抑制合谋行为的发生。

This paper deals with the equilibrium strategies on complementary takeover collusion.Considering the incomplete information of the value on the target and based on the bidding model,we manifest the incentive for collusions and resolve the rational interest compensation,and then get the equilibrium collusion strategies.Furthermore,we analyze the response strategies of the target firm＇s reservation price.It is shown that the bidding collusion does not erode the economic benefit of takeover,and the target firm can restrain from collusion by setting a reasonable reservation price.