高管权力与企业薪酬变动的非对称性

Managerial Power and Asymmetry of Compensation Change in China's Public Companies

本文从薪酬变动的非对称性,即薪酬尺蠖效应的角度研究上市公司高管与普通员工薪酬差距拉大的原因。研究发现,业绩上升时,公司高管获得了相比普通员工更大的薪酬增幅,而在业绩下滑时高管的薪酬增幅并没有显著低于普通员工;业绩上升时,高管薪酬业绩敏感性显著大于普通员工,业绩下降时,高管薪酬存在显著的粘性特征,普通员工薪酬并不存在粘性特征,而且业绩下降时高管薪酬业绩敏感性相比业绩上升时薪酬业绩敏感性的减少幅度显著超过普通员工薪酬业绩敏感性的减少幅度,这表明中国上市公司薪酬存在较为严重的尺蠖效应。

This article studies the reason of enlargement of compensation gap between management and ordinary employees. We find that there is severe geometrid effect in the compensation system in China＇s public companies. When the performance of company increases management share more pay increase than ordinary employees, but the pay increase of management not less than ordinary employees when the performance of company decreases. And when the performance of company increases, the sensitivity of pay to performance of management is larger than ordinary employees, but the pay of management is sticky and the pay of ordinary employees is not when the performance of company decreases.