中国能进一步提高央行独立性以改善货币政策可信度吗?

Can Central Bank Independence Be Enhanced to Improve Monetary Policy Credibility in China?

中央银行独立性是决定货币政策可信度(信誉)的一个重要体制性特征因素。在中国,央行独立性受到政治基础结构、司法独立性、经济金融基础结构和社会文化环境等制度结构方面的现实约束,即便照搬西方国家经验在立法层面确立央行独立性,这种外生的法定独立性也不能转化为真正的实践准则;在当下的中国要改善货币政策可信度,不能期望进一步提高央行独立性来实现,而应寻求其他路径。

Central bank independence is a decisive regime factor to credibility of monetary policy. This paper analyzed the constraints on central bank independence from political infrastructure, judicial independence, economic and financial infrastructure, and the socio -cultural environment in China. Moreover, even when central bank independence is established by legislative reforms like those occurred in industrial countries, this kind of exogenous legal independence can＇ t be put into practice in China. In present, the legal independence of China＇ s central bank should not be relied on to enhance the credibility of China＇ s monetary policy, other path must be found.