观念与世界:洛克与贝克莱的分歧与回应

Ideas and the World:Disagreements between Locke and Berkeley and A Response

洛克的表征实在主义是实体实在论与经验主义表征认识论的合成体。一方面世界是由实体性的物构成的外在于我们观念的世界,而实体性的物本身又包括物的"质"和"物质"两重本体实在,后者支撑前者,因而在本体上更加根本。另一方面我们的观念是由实体的物所引起,观念通过与实体物的"相像"而对它加以表征。出于对洛克哲学隐含的怀疑主义的担忧,贝克莱从形而上学意义上对洛克的表征实在主义作了尖锐的批评,依靠纯粹的哲学思辨驳斥了洛克的诸多概念,并提出了其唯心主义立场。然而,贝克莱的诸多论证却存在严重的缺陷,为自身的哲学体系蒙上了一层阴影。

Locke＇s representative realism is synthesis of corporeal realism of metaphysics and empiricist representationalism of epistemology.It holds that,on the one hand,the world consists of mind-independent corporeal objects,which constituted by their qualities and matter.Matter supports qualities of things and is more fundamental than the latter in metaphysics;on the other hand,the ideas in our mind are caused by corporeal objects,and represent them by means of resemblance between the two.Worried about the perceived skepticism implied by Locke＇s representative realism,Berkeley launched a forceful attack on it.After offering rigorous arguments against Locke＇s many ideas,Berkeley proposed and defended his version of idealism.However,as we argue,many of Berkeley＇s arguments have serious drawbacks,which cast shadow on the tenability of his philosophical systems.