控制性股东与CEO的亲缘关系对企业技术创新能力的影响被引量：2

The Influence of Kinship between CEO and Controlling Ownership on Technological Innovation

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摘要 CEO与控制性股东之间的亲缘关系对企业技术创新能力的培育有重要影响。基于2001-2005年的面板数据,以上市家族公司为样本,检验了上市公司CEO与控制性股东之间的亲缘关系与企业技术创新能力之间的相关性,以及规模和企业寿命的调节作用。实证结果表明:(1)上市公司CEO与控制性股东之间的亲缘关系可以促进企业技术创新能力的提升,而缺少亲缘关系则对企业技术创新能力的提升有阻碍作用;(2)亲缘关系与技术创新能力之间的关系受资产规模与企业寿命的影响,即企业资产规模越大,发展越成熟,亲缘关系对技术创新能力的贡献越弱。 The kinship between CEO and the controlling owner can have an effect on corporate innovative competence. Based on the panel data from Chinese listed family owned finns, this paper finds out that： first, the kinship between CEO and controlling owner has a positive effect on corporate innovative competence. That is, when the CEO is a family member or has a kinship with the controlling owner, the firm＇ s innovative competence is better; and when CEO is not a family member, the firm＇ s innovative competence is lower; second, both the size and life of the firm have negative moderating effects on the relationship between kinship and firm innovative competence, that is, it is better to stress the kinship between CEO and controlling owner in order to improve corporate innovative competence when the size of the finn is smaller and the life of the finn is shorter; family CEO is important for the firm, otherwise, nonfamily CEO is better for improving corporate innovative competence.

作者李婧贺小刚

机构地区上海财经大学国际工商管理学院

出处《科技管理研究》北大核心 2011年第8期148-155,共8页 Science and Technology Management Research

基金国家自然科学基金项目"家族权威与私营企业成长机制研究"(70872065) 上海财经大学第四批研究生科研创新基金资助项目"家族企业的权力配置创新能力与企业绩效关系研究"(CXJJ-2009-317)

关键词控制性股东 CEO 亲缘关系技术创新 controlling owner CEO kinship technological innovation

分类号 F276.6 [经济管理—企业管理] F273.1 [经济管理—企业管理] F224 [经济管理—国民经济]

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