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基于公共产品供给视角的专利联盟形成机制 被引量:1

Research on patent pool coalition mechanism based on public goods supply perspective
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摘要 专利联盟正逐渐成为高新技术产业发展的主导范式,其产业影响遍及全球,并已引起经济学家们的普遍关注。将专利联盟纳入公共产品的范畴分析,给出了一个联盟"形成困境"问题的解决方案。首先,从本质和技术界定两个层面分析了专利联盟的公共产品属性,结论表明专利联盟是一种公共产品。其次,设计了一个G-C机制,它使专利权人如实报告联盟的影响,在公平自愿的基础上加入帕累托改进的联盟,并否决非帕累托改进的联盟。再次,向G-C机制中引入Clarke税,在联盟成立的情况下抵消政府的高额补贴支出,在联盟不成立情况下惩罚垄断专利权人。最后,指出政府在设计专利联盟时须注意的问题。 Patent pool is becoming paradigm of high-tech industry developing;its industrial influence has spread worldwide,and has attracted general attention of economists.This paper brought patent pool into the category of public goods,put forward a solution to the problem of pool coalition dilemma.Firstly,analyzes the public goods attribute of patent pools form the levels of essence and technique definition,the result shows that patent pool is a kind of public goods.Secondly,designed a G-C mechanism,which makes the patentee report the effect of pool honestly,fairly and voluntarily join the Pareto improving pools,and defies the Pareto deteriorating pools.Thirdly,introduced Clarke tax into the G-C mechanism,which can counteract the high cost governmental subsidy expanse,when the pool exists,and punish monopoly patentee when the pool not exists.Last,point out issues which the government should pay attention to when designing the pool.
出处 《科学学研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第4期526-532,共7页 Studies in Science of Science
基金 教育部人文社会科学基金(07JA790081) 国家自然科学基金(70901017)
关键词 专利联盟 形成困境 公共产品 G-C机制 Clarke税 patent pool coalition dilemma public goods G-C mechanism Clarke tax.
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参考文献15

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