序贯创新、创新阻塞与最优专利宽度

Sequential innovation,holdup and optimal patent breadth

通过构建一个包含多项初始专利技术的序贯研发模型讨论了序贯创新背景下最优专利宽度的设计原则,并在此基础上考察了专利宽度对创新阻塞的协调机制以及专利联盟的社会福利效应。在该模型中,专利宽度的调节不仅能够影响后续创新对初始专利技术的侵权概率,还可以改变现有专利技术的实际数量。研究表明,最优的专利宽度应当使事后专利许可下初始专利的期望许可价格等于诱使厂商进行初始研发的临界价格。这一专利宽度水平不仅可以为初始创新提供必要的激励,而且可以限制事前许可价格和事后许可的期望价格,从而缓解许可收费对后续研发决策的扭曲。由于专利联盟的联合利润最大化定价会阻碍专利宽度对事前专利许可定价的调节,因此专利联盟无法增进社会福利,反而可能会带来社会福利的净损失。

This paper,through constructing a model of sequential innovation with numbers of initial patents,analyzes the design of optimal patent breadth,its influences on holdup,and social welfare effects of patent pool.In this paper,patent breadth can influence not only the probability of infringing between new technology and initial patents,but also the maximum number of initial patents.The analysis shows that,the optimal patent breadth should guarantee that the expected price of ex post licensing equals the minimum price that can stimulate initial innovation.This patent breadth,while providing necessary incentives for initial innovation,also limits the price of both ex ante licensing and ex post licensing,and can help avoid distortions of innovation.The analysis of patent pool＇s welfare effects shows that patent pool cannot improve but may cause damages to social welfare,because it will restrain the adjustment of patent breadth on ex ante licensing price.