摘要
以直行交通规则为例,利用演化博弈方法对交通规则的形成进行理论解释.指出有限理性的驾驶员模仿具有高支付策略的行为,导致了群体中选择左行的驾驶员在整个群体中的比例随着时间而变化.这种变化受2个因素的影响:1)选择左行的期望收益与群体平均收益的比较;2)上一时期群体中选择左行的驾驶员比重.最后借助模型分析得到:直行交通规则可以通过群体内各驾驶员间的随机匹配重复博弈自发形成,并且直行交通规则呈现出多样性和局部稳定性.
The thesis explains the origin of traffic rules from evolutionary game,and takes straight rule as an example.Firstly,it points out that bounded rational drivers imitate high pay strategy as his action mode,which leads to the proportion of drivers,who takes left ways,may change with time.Then,the proportion of drivers,who takes left ways,is affected by two factors.One factor is the comparison between income of turning left and income of the colony,and the other is prophase＇s proportion of drivers taking left ways.Finally,by analyzing the model,conclusions are drawn that straight traffic rule is a random matching of repeated game＇s outcomes in bounded rational participants,and straight traffic rule possess diversity and local stability.
出处
《北京工业大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2011年第4期624-627,共4页
Journal of Beijing University of Technology
基金
中国博士后科学基金项目资助(20090460183)
'十一五'国家科技支撑计划项目资助(11506BZ006)
国家自然科学基金项目资助(70773004)
关键词
交通规则
形成
演化博弈
traffic rules
origin
evolutionary game
