风险基金投资中基金经理收益优化决策模型与激励分析

Optimal decision model and incentive analysis of fund managers' return during risk fund investments

通过引入技术努力和工作努力两个主要激发基金经理工作的参变量,在委托代理关系下建立了三个不同前提条件下的非线性优化决策模型,分别给出了基金经理在风险基金投资过程中的技术努力水平和工作努力水平的最优解,还给出了基金经理技术努力水平和工作努力水平之和上界的表达式.同时还分别分析了基金经理对基金投资增值部分所持有的份额、基金的初期投资额以及基金经理对基金投资的最低期望收益率的大小对基金经理的激励作用.

Through introducing two main parameters of both technology effort and work effort which are used to inspire the work of fund managers,we establish three nonlinear optimal decision models based on agency relationship under the different premiss conditions.We give the optimal solutions of both technology effort level and work effort level in the course of the risk fund investment respectively.We also give an expression of the upper bound of the sum of both technology effort level and work effort level.We still analysis the encouragement actions on the fund managers from their portion of the fund investment added values,amount of the original investment of the fund and their minimum expected rate of return.