道德风险视角下的高校教师激励机制研究

Study on incentive mechanism for college teachers from moral hazard perspective

高校教师是高等院校的教学与科研任务的具体承担者,因此对于提高高校教育与科研质量而言,如何克服信息不对称带来的困境、激励教师为所承担的任务积极、努力工作,是一个关键问题。本论文在委托代理视角下研究分析了针对高校教师在完成教学科研任务时的道德风险的产生形式,并探讨了控制其道德风险的激励策略,发现其道德风险的控制效果受到了检测效果的大小和期望聘用年限长短的重要影响。本论文给出了定量描述的影响机制,并对结论的有效性进行了算例分析。

College teachers undertake the teaching and research tasks in colleges and universities. Therefore, how to overcome the problems brought by asymmetry information and motivate teachers to work with all their efforts to improve the quality in both teaching and scientific research is a critical issue. This paper, in the principal-agent perspective, analyzes the forming of moral hazard when teachers perform teaching and research tasks, and explores into incentive strategy of controlling the moral hazard. It finds that the effect of controlling moral hazard is greatly influenced by the detection effects and the expectation of employment years. This paper quantitatively describes the influence mechanism and carries out numerical study to testify the effectiveness.