摘要
为了拯救传统的经验论,蒯因站在自然主义的立场,把认识论自然化,将逻辑实证主义与实用主义相结合,继续发展经验论的事业。但是,有的哲学家对蒯因为自然化认识论设计的路线不以为然,例如,肯定地说,罗蒂认为,蒯因的认识论应该走相对主义的路线;否定地说,里勒认为,蒯因的认识论不应该坚持心理主义的路线。无论哪种评价,都存在着对蒯因自然化认识论要旨的严重误解。
Quine sticks to naturalism, naturalizes epistemology, combines logic positivism and pragmatism in order to save traditional empiricism and go on to develope epistemology' But some philosophers do not agree with Quinean naturalized epistemology, such as, affirmatively speaking, Rorty believes that Quinean epistemology ought to be on the road of relativism; negatively speaking, Lehrer thinks that Quinean epistemology ought not to stick to psychologism. Neither of these two estimations has serious misunderstanding to the keystone of Quinean nat- uralized epistemology.
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第4期1-7,共7页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
基金
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(DUT10RW203)
辽宁省社科联人文社科基金(2010lslktzx-03)资助