制度供给、财政分权与中国的农村治理

Institutional Supply,Fiscal Decentralization and Rural Governance in China.

治理分为经济治理和政治治理两类项目。在中国自上而下供给主导型制度变迁的基本模式下,有必要在一个统一的框架内梳理新中国建立以来农村经济和政治治理的变迁情况。在供给主导型制度变迁模式下,中央政府针对农村治理的制度安排,往往受中央政府不同政策目标的权衡及地方政府激励相容条件的制约,从这个意义上讲,人民公社时期和改革开放至今,中国农村经济治理和政治治理的原则,都是内生于以财政收支为主要内容的国家建构过程的。特别是由于治理的实施既有赖于中央政府不同政策目标间的权衡,同时也取决于地方政府的支持和配合,因而蕴涵在不同层级政府间财政收支安排中的政府收支责任及地方政府的激励相容问题,对中国农村治理有重要影响。

The central government＇s institutional arrangements for rural area governance tend to be subjected to the central government＇s trade-off between different policy objectives, and the local government＇s incentive compatibility conditions under the supply-led institutional transformation model. In this sense, we argue that the governance structure over the period of the People＇s Commune and the Reform and Opening-up are endogenous within the state-building process, in which fiscal capability is the main content. Specifically, the incentive compatibility problem for the local government and the multi-tasks for the central government are crucial for China＇s local governance.