中小企业信用监管路径演化研究

A Study of SME's Credit Supervisory Evolution

为研究中小企业信用监管路径演化,借助演化经济学方法,建立了中小企业与信用管理部门之间博弈的支付矩阵,并分析个体策略选择对群体行为的影响,进而分析群体行为特征和均衡态;用数值仿真展示了决策参数的不同取值和初始条件的改变对演化结果的影响。研究发现:中小企业信用监管路径演化系统收敛于理想状态与不良"锁定"状态2种模式,通过调节参数可以优化中小企业信用监管路径演化,诱导微观个体朝着期望的方向演化。

To investigate the principles of SME＇s credit supervisory evolution, we construct a payment matrix between SME and social credit management department from the view point of evolutionary economics. We analyze the impact of individual choice over group behaviors followed by characterization of the group behaviors and their equilibrium states. Through a simulation study, the paper shows the impact of decision parameters and initial conditions on the evolution and finds that the SME＇s credit supervisory evolution may converge to two modes： an ideal status and a＂locked＂ status. By adjusting the decision parameters, we can optimize SME＇s credit supervisory route and stimulate individuals to evolve towards the expected direction.