隐性业绩评价与高管薪酬契约——基于价值创造的视角

Implicit Performance Evaluation and Manager Compensation Contracts——Based on the Perspective of Value Creation

以会计业绩为基础的薪酬契约无法真正衡量管理层的努力程度,在不完备的薪酬契约执行过程中,管理层薪酬决定者执行薪酬契约的方式决定了高管的努力方向和努力程度。研究发现,在薪酬契约执行过程中,薪酬决定者在考核管理层时,不仅考虑会计业绩,同时也考虑企业价值创造指标,薪酬决定者对管理层的隐性考核可以激励管理层在未来进行更多的价值创造。与会计业绩相类似,高管薪酬与经济增加值的相关性也体现出不对称性特征。此外还发现,相比国有企业,民营企业更多地采用价值创造指标来考核管理层。

This paper finds that both the accounting-based performance and the indicators of value creation are considered by compensation decision-makers in the process of implementing the payment contracts. The implicit assessment of managers could encourage executives to create more future value. Similar to the accounting performance,the correlation between executive compensation and EVA also reflects the asymmetric characteristics. The authors also find that the indicators of value creation were less used in SOE （state-owned enterprises） than in private enterprises.