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基于道德风险防范的虚拟联盟成员二元激励模型研究 被引量:4

Binary Incentive Model for Virtual Alliance Members Based on Moral-hazard Precautions
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摘要 提出一个基于对联盟成员信用评价和业绩分成的混合激励方案,通过建立二元任务下的多代理人模型,解决基于协作平台合作的虚拟联盟中盟主和成员间的委托代理问题;以移动增值服务中运营商和服务提供商的联盟合作为例,模型指出该激励机制能更好地达到激励业绩,同时消除成员机会主义风险的目的。 A hybrid incentive mechanism based on credit tournament and revenue sharing among virtual alliance members is proposed to solve the principal-agent problem in binary-task on an advanced collaboration platform.Taking the alliance of mobile network operator and service provider as example,a multi-agents model is developed to prove that the proposed incentive schema is a better way of reducing opportunism and improving alliance performance.
出处 《管理学报》 CSSCI 2011年第5期739-744,共6页 Chinese Journal of Management
基金 国家自然科学基金资助重点项目(70731001)
关键词 虚拟联盟 治理 移动增值服务 委托代理 激励机制 virtual alliance governance mobile value-added service principal-agent incentive mechanism
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