竞争环境下基于顾客策略行为的易逝品动态定价研究

Optimal Dynamic Pricing for Perishable Assets in Competitive Markets with Strategic Consumers

在两个提供相同易逝品的零售商折线竞争下,从顾客策略行为出发,研究竞争环境下两零售商的动态定价策略。首先建立供大于求的情况下两零售商动态定价模型,给出了均衡价格满足的条件,并探讨了在一些特殊情况下均衡价格的特性。然后将这一模型扩展到供小于求的情形,探讨模型的求解方法。算例分析了在折线竞争模式下零售商在面对顾客策略行为时,如何动态的决定价格。同时发现,在供大于求的情况下,顾客策略行为导致零售商的收益降低;在供小于求的情况下,一定程度的顾客策略行为可以使零售商获得更高的期望收益。

This paper introduces a dynamic pricing model for two retailers who perishable products to a finite population of strategic consumers.We first consider the basic zigzag competition model where the retailers can satisfy the entire market demand.We provide equilibrium optimality conditions for both consumer and seller,and prove monotonicity results for special cases.We further extend the model to the situations where the retailers cannot satisfy the entire market demand.We demonstrate the effect of strategic consumer behavior on the performance of pricing policies through numerical examples and show that strategic customer behavior exerts significant pressure on prices,resulting with a substantial decline in profit.We also find that when the retailers cannot satisfy the entire market demand,strategic customer behavior need not always be detrimental to the seller.