期刊文献+

中国上市银行特许权价值和银行稳健性关系的实证研究 被引量:9

Empirical Study about the relationship between the Listed banks' Franchise Value and Bank Stability
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摘要 特许权价值等于银行在未来持续从事经营活动所得到的超额利润的现值,它的自律效应能够促进银行的稳健经营。在对特许权价值和银行稳健性关系的形成机理进行分析的基础上,构建特许权价值和银行稳健性的计量经济模型,并采用14家上市银行2000-2010年的非平衡面板数据进行实证检验。研究发现,银行的特许权价值越高,对银行的稳健性的促进作用越明显;隐性保险制度削弱了特许权价值对银行稳健的影响;银行规模越大稳健性越好;次贷危机影响了银行的稳健性。 Bank franchise value is equal to the present value of excess profits which will obtain by continuously business activities in the future,it's self-regulation effect can promote bank stability.Basing on the analysis of the relationship between the franchise value and bank stability this article constructs the econometric model of franchise value and bank stability and uses the 14 listed banks' unbalanced panel data from 2000 to 2010 to test econometric model.Found that: the higher franchise value,the more obvious effects of self-discipline,the better the stability of banks;implicit insurance system weakened the function of franchise value in promoting bank stability;too big to fall;Subprime mortgage crisis has affected the stability of banks.
出处 《统计与信息论坛》 CSSCI 2011年第4期72-77,共6页 Journal of Statistics and Information
关键词 特许权价值 银行稳健性 银行规模 次贷危机 隐性保险 franchise value bank stability bank size subprime crisis implicit insurance
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参考文献6

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二级参考文献24

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