“金字塔”结构、两权分离与公司价值被引量：10

Pyramids Ownership Structure,Separation of Control and Cash Flow Ownership and Value of Company

下载PDF

导出

摘要企业的集团化伴随着"金字塔"式的多层控股结构的产生,"金子塔"股权结构带来了控股股东控制权与现金流权的分离,进而对公司价值产生影响。文章运用我国上市公司数据,检验了"金字塔"股权结构、两权分离对公司价值的影响状况与影响机制。研究结论对于加强上市公司监管、完善公司治理、保护中小投资者利益具有重要启示。 As a type of general ownership structures, pyramids cause the separation of corporate ownership and cash holding of ultimate control shareholders, and influence company value. This paper examines the above theoretical hypothesis by using the data of listed company in 2007 and 2008 of China. The results indicate that the motivations of ＂tunneling＂ or ＂propping＂ are affected by the separation degree of control and cash flow ownership of pyramids structures. The result is significant for the supervision of listed company, the improvement of corporate governance and the protection of medium and small sized investors.

作者崔学刚张宏亮

机构地区北京工商大学商学院

出处《上海立信会计学院学报》北大核心 2011年第2期3-13,共11页 Journal of Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce

基金国家社会科学基金项目(08CJY008) 北京市自然科学基金项目(9112005) 北京市社会科学规划重点项目(08AbjG215) 北京市教育委员会高层次人才资助计划(PHR20100512)

关键词 “金字塔” 股权结构两权分离利益攫取利益支持 pyramids ownership structure separation of control and cash flow ownership tunneling propping

分类号 F27 [经济管理—企业管理]

引文网络
相关文献

参考文献31

1La Porta R. , Lopez-de-Salinas F. , Shleifer A. Corpo- rate ownership around the world [ J ]. Journal of Finance, 1999,54(2) : 471 -517.
2Claessens Stijn, Joseph P. H Fan, Larry H. P. Lang. The benefits and costs of group affiliation evidence from East Asia [ J]. Centre for Economic Policy Research, Working Paper, 2002.
3Faccio Mara, Larry H. P. Lang, Leslie Young. Debt and expropriation[ R]. Centre for Economic Policy Research, Working Paper, 2000.
4Bertrand M. , Mullainathan S. Pyramids[ J]. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2003, 1:478 -483.
5Johnson S., La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A. Tunneling[ J]. American Economic Review, 2000, 90(2) : 22 -27;.
6Obata, S. Pyramid groups, financial distress and inves- tor protection [ R]. Harvard University, Working Paper, 2001.
7Friedman E. , S Johnson, T. Mitton. Propping and tunneling[ J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, 2003, 31(4) , 732-750.
8Adolf A. Berle, Gardiner C. Means. The Modem Corporation and Private Property [ M ]. New York : Harcourt, Brace & World, 1932.
9Jensen, M. & Meckling, W. The theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership struc- ture[ J], Journal of Financial Economics, 1976,3( 1 ) : 305 - 360.
10Sanford Jay Grossman, Oliver D. Hart. The costs and benefits of" ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration[ J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94 (4) : 691 -719.