范围经济、集体外包与市场价格

Scope economies,collectively outsourcing and market prices

为解释供应链城等由于集体外包行为导致的集聚现象,建立一个由一个承包方和多个外包客户参与的博弈模型,定义完全参与的集体外包均衡(FPCOE),并通过FPCOE建立范围经济和最终市场价格之间的联系.结果表明,1)如果范围经济程度达到足够高水平,并且存在一个触发客户,则FPCOE将是唯一的博弈均衡;2)在FPCOE的情形下,最终市场的价格随着范围经济程度的提高而下降;3)当范围经济的程度进一步提高,FPCOE对应的最终市场价格低于自制均衡时的价格.这意味着,范围经济可以通过集体外包行为为最近观察到供应链城等集聚现象和"中国价格"现象提供一个可行的解释.

In order to explain the observations of clustering phenomena （such as the supply chain cities） caused by collectively outsourcing, this paper builds a game model with one outsourcing contractor and multi-potential outsourcing clients, defines the full participation collectively outsourcing equilibrium （FPCOE） , and links scope economies and the prices in the final markets through FPCOE. The results show that 1） if the degree of scope economies reaches a high enough level and there is a trigger client, FPCOE is a unique equilibrium of our model; 2） under FPCOE, the prices in the final markets decreases with the degree of scope economies; 3） when the degree of scope economies rises to a much higher level, the prices in the final markets under FPCOE fall below those under the equilibrium where none client chooses to outsource. This means that scope economies can be applied, through collectively outsourcing, to explain the recently observed phenomena such as the supply chain cities and the China price.