承诺成本与OEM下的供应链契约协调机制

Commitment Cost and Contractual Coordination Machanism of Supply Chain under OEM

考虑契约承诺成本就能改变供应链协调模型的均衡。假如承诺成本足够高,确定性和非确定性承诺策略都使得单边支付成为唯一稳定的非严格占优均衡;当排除了不完全信息和导致单边支付的外在约束之后,非相容性承诺则是分歧产生的原因。以OEM下由互补性供应商单组装商组成的典型供应链为例,得到了基于供应商之间最优反应的回购契约并允许加上再协商的契约协调机制可极大改善成员福利并达成唯一稳定均衡的结论,并用数值算例予以了印证。

we can basically alter the equilibrium of coordination model of supply chain when considering commitment cost.If the cost is high enough,the unilateral payment is only a non-strict dominant strategy under either certain or uncertain commitment;when the imperfect information and all exogenous constraints leading to unilateral payment are excluded,incompatible commitment will cause conflicts.Taking supply chain with complementary suppliers for example,each supplier can improve his performance by offering a return policy to the assembler while the best contract depends on that offered by the other supplier.Moreover,the suppliers still have the rights to negotiate with each other to share their profits properly.There is a unique and stable equilibrium in which the optimal contract happens to fully coordinate the whole chain.Finally a numerical example has verified this conclusion.