风险分类对保险市场效率的影响分析

Analysis on efficiency of risk classification in insurance markets

本文将社会福利作为衡量保险市场效率的标准,分析保险人的风险分类行为是否有助于信息不对称保险市场效率的提高。本文首先证明了信息不对称保险市场存在市场失灵,然后比较了实施风险分类前后社会福利的差异。结论表明:当保险市场处于R-S均衡时,准确性较高的分类能使社会福利得到改进,准确性不高的分类不能使社会福利得到改进;当保险市场处于wilson均衡时,除非保险人能对投保人进行较准确的分类,否则风险分类反而会使社会福利下降。

Using social welfare as an index of market efficiency, the articles tried to analyze whether risk classifica- tion could improve efficiency of insurance markets with information asymmetry. At first,the article testified that there was market malfunction in insurance markets with information asymmetry;and then, comparing differences of social welfare before and after implementing risk classification, the article reached the conclusion：when the insurance mar- ket was in a R-S equilibrium, social welfare will be improved if risk classification is accurate, but inaccurate risk classification could not enhance social welfare;when the insurance market was in a Wilson equilibrium,risk classification would decrease social welfare unless the insurer could make more accurate classification of applicants.