摘要
设计了交通BOO(build,own and operate)项目的竞标机制来提高项目拍卖者对特许经营权的配置效率.运用激励机制设计思想建立了竞标机制模型,在保证竞标企业参与投标和真实显示自己的经营能力的条件下最大化期望社会福利,通过求解此模型得到了最优的竞标机制;鉴于最优机制在形式上的复杂性,给出了得分规则拍卖和供应契约拍卖两种最优拍卖方式.
A franchise bidding mechanism is designed for traffic BOO(build,own and operate) project from the view of the regulator. The main purpose of this paper is to design a set of bidding mechanism sci- entifically and reasonably to improve the alloeative efficiency of franchise bidding. The model of bidding is established based on the incentive mechanism, which is to maximize the expected social welfare on the con- dition of participation and truly displaying the managing ability of the companies. Then, the optimal biding mechanism is obtained by solving the model. Furthermore, we implement the optimal outcome by firstscore sealed-bid and supply contract auction.
出处
《武汉大学学报(理学版)》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2011年第2期131-136,共6页
Journal of Wuhan University:Natural Science Edition
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(60574071
78771078
70471034)