Private Benefits of Politicians and Delayed Privatization

Private Benefits of Politicians and Delayed Privatization

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作者 Michal Katdofiski Jacek Mizerka

机构地区 University of Economics

出处《Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing》 2011年第4期368-379,共12页 现代会计与审计（英文版）

关键词政治家利益私有化延迟经济转型控制权国有企业测量控制 political control, private benefits, privatization, real options

参考文献19

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Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing

2011年第4期

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