股权制衡的公司治理绩效模型研究

A Model Study on the Corporate Governance Performance of Shareholders Balance Mechanism

本文分别从控股股东与非控股大股东的绩效函数出发,建立股权制衡的公司治理绩效模型,用以分析控股股东利益侵占和公司股权制衡的作用关系。研究发现:一方面,公司股权制衡受到控股股东侵占行为的操纵,表现为控股股东侵占对股权制衡的正向作用;另一方面,股权制衡能够提升公司治理绩效,表现为股权制衡对控股股东侵占的负向影响。另外,非控股大股东具有与控股股东相互合谋的动机,以实现对公司中小股东利益的联合侵占。

We construct a model about the corporate governance performance of shareholders balance mechanism （ short as SBM ） to analyze the relationship between SBM and controlling shareholder ＇ s tunneling behaviors. From the performance functions of controlling and non - control large shareholders, our mathematical research finds out corporate SBM is manipulated by the tunneling of controlling shareholder on one hand, which shows that the controlling shareholder＇ s tunneling has positive effect on corporate SBM; and on the other hand, corporate governance performance is improved by SBM, which is manifested by the negative influence of corporate SBM on controlling shareholder＇ s tunneling. Furthermore, there is probability of collusion between controlling and non - control large shareholders so as to achieve the joint expropriation of the interests of minority shareholders.