经营者将要退休是否影响公司绩效——以中国A股市场为例

Are There the End-of-the-game Effects——Evidence from Chinese Stock Markets

我们的研究从静态和动态两个角度展开,分析了经营者将要退休这一事件对公司当前盈利能力和未来发展潜力的影响。对全部样本的实证研究显示:经营者将要退休与公司的盈利指标、成长性指标显著负相关,控制权属性虚拟变量与以上指标显著负相关。进而将样本按照最终控制权是否为国有分开后发现,这种负相关性在国有控股企业中表现得尤为明显,在以民营企业为主的非国有控股企业中则不显著。59岁现象在两组企业中表现差异的原因有二:第一,退休政策在两组企业中执行的力度不同;第二,国有控股企业可能具有更高的代理成本,从而59岁现象可能更加严重。

We analyze whether the end - of - the - game affects corporate performance, such as profitability and potentiality. The empirical evidence is that the end - of - the - game can worsen ROE and Net asset growth rate. When we separate samples according to whether the ultimate control rights are state owned or not, we find that negative correlation is significant in state owned firms but not significant in private firms. We also find that state owned firm has poorer performance than similar private firm. The difference maybe comes from two aspects, nonobservance of retirement policy and the agency cost.