外部治理机制与企业过度投资--来自中国A股的经验证据

External Governance Mechanisms and Corporate Over-investment——From the Empirical Evidence of Chinese A Shares

本文以中国A股市场2001年至2006年的所有非金融类上市公司为初始样本,研究了外部治理机制对公司过度投资的治理效应,得出以下结论:产品竞争越激烈,公司过度投资水平越低。公司信息披露质量与过度投资水平呈负相关关系。地区市场化指数、政府干预指数和信贷资金分配的市场化都能有效抑制处于该地区的上市公司的过度投资冲动,说明了地方政府在各个地区干预程度的差异所导致的不同经济后果,而地区法治化程度并不能对公司过度投资产生有效的影响。

This paper uses all China a -share non -financial listed companies in 2001 -2006 as initial samples, to analyze how external governance mechanisms affect overinvestment of companies. This paper finds the following conclusions ： The more competitive product market, the lower level of over - investment the company has ; the company information disclosure quality has significantly negative correlation with the level of investment; regional market index, government intervention index and market - oriented allocation level of funds can effectively inhibited over - investment in regional listed companies, which shows different degree of intervention by local governments in various regions has caused different economic consequences. However, the degree of rule of law in the region has different impact on over - investment in the company. The evidence provides a new idea to improve external governance mechanisms and securities regulators.