补救成本、价值损失抑或获益赔偿?——瑕疵履行救济的研究被引量：4

Cost to Remedy,Loss in Value or Disgorgement? —Study on Remedies of Defective Performance

导出

摘要瑕疵履行时,法院是施加救济成本还是价值损失的赔偿是合同法的难点之一。赔偿计算方式的选择必须体现期望损害赔偿的目标。目前流行的Peevyhouse规则、经济浪费规则和价值损失规则都有明显缺陷,而综合考虑意图、合理性以及政策则是目前规则的最好取代。而且获益赔偿可作为补救成本、价值损失之外的第三种可能实现期望损害赔偿目标的计算方式。我国现行《合同法》过于强调救济成本虽总体可行,但没有认真对待救济成本与价值损失之间的关系,也没有考虑获益赔偿的可能性,并不妥当。未来《合同法》应在此方面进一步完善。 Whether cost to remedy or loss in value is the better measure in defective performance of contract is a key point.The choice must embody the goal of expectation damages.The popular rules of Peevyhouse Rule,Economic Waste Rule and Ruel of Loss in Value have expressive shortcomings,while the comprehensive criterions of intent,reasonableness and policy may be the best alternative.And the disgorgement should be the third measure of damages in complete or defective performance.Current Contract Law of PRC only emphasizes the cost to complete is feasible as a whole,but it should supplement the other two measures which are loss in value and disgorgement.

作者孙良国

机构地区清华大学法学院吉林大学法学院

出处《法制与社会发展》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第3期33-47,共15页 Law and Social Development

基金国家社科基金项目"合同法中的预期与信赖保护研究"(10CFX044) 吉林大学"211工程"三期重点学科建设项目"中国特色社会主义民主法治理论与实践" 吉林大学创新团队建设项目"权利本位与中国民法法典化"

关键词补救成本价值损失获益赔偿瑕疵履行期望损害赔偿 the cost to remedy loss in value disgorgement defective performance expectation damages

分类号 D923.6 [政治法律—民商法学]

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参考文献45

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二级参考文献35

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