经理激励、负债与企业价值

Managerial Incentive,Debt and Firm Value

已有研究表明,经理薪酬与负债都会影响企业价值。然而,作为激励机制的薪酬与作为约束机制的负债在影响企业价值上究竟存在何种关系,尽管文献在理论方面有所探讨,但缺乏相应的实证证据支持。以中国沪深两市2002—2008年间的A股上市公司作为研究样本,本文的实证检验结果表明,无论是以薪酬衡量的显性激励还是以在职消费衡量的隐性激励,经理激励和负债在对企业价值的影响上具有显著的替代关系;同时,这一关系在不同性质的企业中,以及不同市场化水平下具有一定的差异性。本文所得出的研究结论不仅丰富了资本结构、委托代理等相关理论,对于现实中的企业决策也具有较强启示意义。

The question how the compensation and debt interact to the firm value, though studied in the theoretical literature, has not been empirically studied. Based on the data of Chinese listed firms from 2002 to 2008, the paper shows that there is a substitute relationship between manager incentive and debt, in which the compensation is measured by monetary salary and by perks. Further, we find this relationship differs under different nature of the firm and different level of marketization. Our study not only enriches the theory of capital structure and agency, but also inspires the firm decision.