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外部控制能否有效约束寿险公司管理层——基于并购后CEO留任的实证分析

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摘要 文章针对1998—2005年被成功收购的308家美国寿险公司,使用Logistic回归研究了影响并购后目标公司CEO留任的因素。研究结果表明,并购完成一年后,73.7%的目标公司的CEO被替换。目标公司CEO在并购后是否留任取决于CEO与董事会主席的两职合一、公司规模和并购交易的支付方式等因素。然而,并购前的公司业绩对目标公司CEO在并购后的留任却无显著影响,这表明,在寿险业,并购作为一种外部控制并未起到有效约束管理层的作用。
作者 邵立
出处 《生产力研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第4期113-115,125,共4页 Productivity Research
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