并购败绩后撤换CEO吗?——我国上市公司内外部治理机制有效性检验

Does Bad Bidder Fired after Acquisition?——Testing the Efficiency of Corporate Governance in Chinese Listed Companies

本文结合中国制度背景,首次从CEO实施价值损害型并购后是否被撤换的角度来考察公司内外部治理机制的有效性。实证检验发现:(1)大约有三分之一的CEO在并购之后三年内被非自愿变更,其中被公司内部治理机制变更的CEO占28%,而被公司外部治理机制也就是因公司控制权变更而撤换的CEO占6%;(2)并购公告前后的短期市场反应越差,CEO在并购后3～5年内越可能被非自愿变更;(3)同样实施价值损害型并购,民营企业CEO被变更的概率远高于国有企业,究其原因可能是民营企业的外部治理机制即公司控制权市场在约束CEO行为方面比国有企业有效。

In this paper, we examine the efficiency of corporate governance by testing CEOs＇ turnover after bad bids. We find that： one third of CEOs of acquiring firms are replaced within 3 years, including 28% by internal governance, 6% by takeovers; （2） A significant inverse relation exists between bidder returns and the likelihood of CEO turnover ; （3） This inverse relation is stronger for private-owned enterprises, while weaker for state-owned enterprises. This is consistent with the fact that CEOs of private-owned enterprises is more disciplined by market for corporate control.