税收分权与经济增长——基于省际面板数据的实证分析

Tax Decentralization and Economic Growth:An Empirical Analysis Based on Provincial Panel Data

通过建立面板数据计量模型,利用1999-2008年中国30个省(自治区、直辖市)的数据(不含西藏和港澳台地区),对税收分权与经济增长之间的关系进行实证分析。结果显示:在中国式财政分权体制下,无论是从全国还是从分区域看,提高税收分权度对经济增长均具有消极作用。其原因并不是税收分权本身对经济增长有消极作用,而是不合理的税收分权制度安排,抵消了分权带来的激励效果。因此,要提高税收分权对经济增长的激励效果,就必须理顺中央与地方间的税权关系,赋予地方一定的税收立法权;理顺中央和地方间的事权关系,明晰各级政府的税权范围;理顺税费关系,规范制度外收入渠道,完善政府间财政转移支付制度。

By establish a panel data econometric model and making use of the data of China＇s 30 provinces（autonomous regions and municipalities,not including Tibet and Hong Kong,Macao and Taiwan regions） from 1999 to 2008,this paper conducts an empirical analysis of the relationship between tax decentralization and economic growth.The results show that under the Fiscal Decentralization system of Chinese style,either from the national or regional perspective,to raise the level of tax decentralization will have a negative effect on economic growth.The reason is not that the tax decentralization itself has a negative effect on economic growth,but that the unreasonable tax decentralized institutional arrangements will offset the effects of incentive decentralization.Therefore,in order to improve incentives effects of tax decentralization on economic growth,the tax power relations between the central and local governments must be rationalized,certain local tax legislative power should be empowered to the local government;the governance between the central and local governments should be straightened,and the range of tax powers between governments at different levels should be clarified;the relationship between tax and duties should be disentangled,the income channels outside of the institution should be regulated,and the inter-governmental fiscal transfer payment system should be improved.