基于“进入权激励”的知识——资本剩余索取权混合契约分析

A Study on Complex-Contract Structure of Knowledge-Capital Residual Claim Based on "Right of Access Incentive"

本文从"进入权激励"视角出发,指出了资本剩余索取权安排的局限性,将知识资源作为重要变量纳入企业剩余索取权安排合约,构建了一个包含资本和知识两变量的企业收益函数,分析结果表明按照不同的要素贡献率,存在一种激励的替代性变化,显示出知识资源的不可或缺性。在此基础上,进一步引入资源"粘性"和资源投入水平,揭示企业的最优委托权安排与资源的"粘性"和投入水平存在单调递增的关系,而知识资源由于与其所有者的不可分性使其具有高度的"粘性",再加上知识和资本的合作博弈本身就是一个动态过程,知识投入水平高低会影响最后的动态均衡结果,因此应该获得更多的企业剩余索取权。

Based on the perspective of 'right of access incentive',this paper indicates the limitations of contract on residual claim of capital and builds a revenue function with capital and knowledge variables.It is found that there is a change in incentive substitution showing the indispensability of knowledge as a resource.Then resource 'stickiness'and input level are introduced to reveal the relationship of monotone increase between optimal principal arrangement and resource stickiness and input level,while knowledge resource has high 'stickiness' and knowledge input influences the dynamic equilibrium and thus should have more residual claim.