委托代理视角下中央企业高管人员问责制研究

Senior administrator accountability of central enterprises in the perspective of Principal-Agent Theory

加强对中央企业高管人员的监管,形成良性的制约机制是执政党和政府在经济管理和社会治理中的重要课题。从委托代理理论的角度分析,我国现有的中央企业高管人员问责机制还存在着问责主客体欠明确、问责体制欠协调、问责机制欠完善等不符合现实监管要求和制度设计不够严谨的问题。当务之急,应理顺中央企业管理的委托代理关系,改善问责机制发挥的制度环境,界定不同问责主体的权责,从法律上明确被问责者的责任承担范围和成本。

It is important to strengthen the supervision of senior administrators of central enterprises, and establish a good supervision mechanism in economic management and social governance of the INS and the government. Based on Principal-Agent theory, this paper analyzed Principal-Agent relationship, the subject of rights in central enterprise management, and problems concerning the accountability of the Central Enterprise Senior Admin- istrator. Suggestions were put forward to straighten the Principal-Agent relationship of the central enterprise manage- ment, improve the institutional environment of the accountability mechanism, define the power and responsibility of the different enterprise, and clarify the accountability of the enterprises in legal terms.