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地方政府推动经济增长:财政激励的重新解释 被引量:3

Local governments promote economic growth in China:Re-examination of fiscal incentive
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摘要 在解释中国的经济改革和经济增长中,原先的"维护市场的财政联邦制"强调地方高的边际财政分成对地方促进市场化改革的重要作用,但分税制改革改变了这种认识。主张中央集权下晋升锦标赛作用的学者强调即使地方财政激励很低,晋升的激励也足以保证地方按照中央要求努力发展经济。文章讨论了晋升激励存在的一些局限,认为其作用可能被高估了,并对分税制后地方政府推动经济增长的财政激励做了前后一致的解释。 In the market-preserving federalism's view on China's economic growth, importance is put on the marginal fiscal sharing to prompt local governments' incentive in economic growth. But after the reform of tax distribution in 1994, this sharing is dropping in the local budgeting. As alternative, promotion tournament was reviewed as a more consistent argument tot China's economic growth before and after 1994. We doubt the promotion tournament's effect and attempt to clarify the mechanism of fiscal incentive for the local govenament.
作者 陈健
出处 《广州大学学报(社会科学版)》 2011年第4期32-38,共7页 Journal of Guangzhou University:Social Science Edition
关键词 地方政府 财政分权 锦标赛 财政激励 local government Fiscal decentralization tournament fircal incentive
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参考文献18

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二级参考文献267

共引文献7608

同被引文献22

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