摘要
猪肉供应链各主体间存在着基于安全成本的博弈问题。文中运用进化动态博弈模型建立猪肉供应链各主体间基于安全成本的博弈关系,对下游主体监督上游主体的稳定状态进行分析,揭示双方的行为特征及其稳定状态,为猪肉供应链各主体的安全管理提供参考。
The games existed between the subjects in pork supply chain based on safety cost.In this paper,the dynamic evolution games are applied to build the game model of subjects in pork supply chain based on safety cost and the stable state of supervision from downstream subjects to upstream subjects are also analyzed to reveal their behavioral characterristics and its stable state,which can be used to assist the safety management for the subjects of pork supply chain.
出处
《物流工程与管理》
2011年第4期100-102,共3页
Logistics Engineering and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(51008087)
关键词
供应链
猪肉
安全成本
动态进化博弈
supply chain
pork
safety cost
dynamic evolution game
