政府外部性视角下的基础设施建设与行政空间扩张分析——一个基于外部性问题内部化的假说

Analysis on the Relation between Infrastructure Construction and Administrative Boundary Extend from View of Governmental Externality——A Supposition of Interiorization to Governmental Externality

从行政区域的角度来看,公共选择理论中的政治外部性问题表现在不同地区间公共决策的相互影响,即由于基础设施所具有的外部性特征,导致相邻地区的政府在供给基础设施中的内在动力欠缺。以合并为主要方式的行政区划调整,将原先不同管辖范围的地方政府予以归并,扩大了地方政府的行政空间范围。从经济效率的视角来看,这种合并对基础设施的外部性特征作了收益内部化的矫正,由此激励了以政府为主体的地方基础实施建设投资增长,同时伴以规模经济特征,提高了供给效率,最终增加了居民的公共福利水平,也进一步推动了地方经济的发展。

In public choice theory,the problem of externality is appeared in the effects of public decision among difference areas from view of administrative scope.It is specifically found in the infrastructures construction by local Governments.The character of infrastructure＇s externality makes governments reduce the incentive on infrastructure supply.Mergence,from view of economic,amplifies a local government＇s administrative boundary,which make the externality become a internality issue.As result,local governments are motivated to increase investment on infrastructures.At the same time,the effectiveness of construction is enhanced by the appearance of economies of scale.As a conclusion,mergence mean more public welfare and propel local economical development.