中国上市银行薪酬激励与银行绩效

Remuneration Incentive and Performance of China's Listed Banks

本文以14家股份制商业银行为样本,从公司治理视角分析上市银行CEO报酬及银行内的报酬差异与银行经营绩效间的关系。研究结果表明,中国上市银行员工薪酬激励与银行绩效有显著的正相关关系;缩小银行高管薪酬和员工薪酬差异对银行绩效有显著的正相关影响;股权激励对上市银行绩效的影响并不显著;银行高管内部薪酬差异却存在锦标赛竞争机制,即银行高管间适当的薪酬差异可以提升银行绩效。因此,改变目前中国上市银行报酬—绩效契约是今后的金融业改革中需要解决的重要问题。

With fourteen joint-stock commercial banks as samples, this paper analyses the relationship between the CEO＇s remuneration, remuneration differential and the bank performance from the perspective of corporate governance. The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between employee remuneration incentive and bank performance; narrowing the remuneratinn differential between senior management and employee will result in significant positive impacts on bank performance; equity incentive has no obvious impact on bank performance; internal remuneration differential in senior management helps the formatiou of championship competition mechanism, that is, to improve bank performance. Therefore, to change the current compensation-performance contracts of Chiua＇s listed banks is an important task in future financial reform.