审计质量VS.信号显示——终极控制权、大股东治理战略与审计师选择

Audit Quality Vs Signaling Effect

本文重新考量新兴资本市场的有效性和在新兴市场特殊市场环境中的国际四大会计师事务所与审计质量的关系,研究属于不同利益阵营、治理战略各异的公司大股东与外部审计师选择(国际四大)、审计收费、审计质量(盈余质量和审计意见)之间可能存在的复杂关联,勾勒控股股东、其他大股东在外部审计师选择方面的治理战略。研究发现:控股股东控制权比例、现金流权比例、其他大股东制衡度与上市公司聘任国际四大的概率之间表现为倒U型关系;控股股东控制权与现金流权偏离程度越高,上市公司越有可能选择国际四大。

In this paper, we reconsider efficiency of emerging capital market and the relationships between international Big Four Auditors and audit quality in special environment in emerging market, Then, the paper explores the complicated relationships between blockholders belongs to different groups and with different governance strategies, and external auditors choice, audit fee and audit quality, and dig out governance strategy of controlling shareholders and other blockholders for external auditor choice, We find that there are inverted U - shape relationships between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders, counterbalance degree of other blockholders and the likelihood of employing international Big Four Auditors; deviation of control rights and cash flow fights is positively associated with the possibility of employing international Big Four Auditors.