美国碳关税政策的政治经济学分析--基于美国国内利益集团与政府博弈的视角

Political Economics analysis on U.S.carbon Tariff Policy——Based on the Game Theory's perspective between U.S.domestic interest groups and the Government

美国的政治体制和贸易政策形成的机制,表明其"碳关税"政策是国内利益集团和政府博弈均衡的结果。文章在Grossman-Helpman(1994)"销售保护模型"的基础上,建立碳关税博弈模型,构建利益函数对利益集团和政府的行为进行博弈模拟。结果显示,如果美国政府是一个自利政府,同时存在利益集团政治捐献的情况下,政府出于自身利益最大化的考虑会提高碳关税税率,以保护利益集团和自身的利益。同时,利益集团在政府收益函数中的权重越高(即政府获得的政治捐献越高),碳关税政策将更多地受到利益集团游说的影响。

According to the American political system and the mechanism of the formation about US.trade policy,this paper argues that America＇s ＂carbon tariff＂ policy is Equilibrium results of the U.S.domestic interest groups and the government.Based on the ＂sale protection model＂（Grossman Helpman,1994）,this paper has established a carbon tariff game model,building interests functions and conducting the game simulation between the interest groups and the government.The results show that the Government will raise the carbon tariff rates to maximize the interests of his own and interests groups if the U.S.government is a selfish government,and there exist political donations implemented by interest groups.Meanwhile,if the higher weight of interests group in government revenue function（ie,the government obtain higher political donations）,carbon tariff policy will be more affected by interest groups lobbying.