收益时滞性、任职短期性与银行科层经理人有效激励分析

目前,国有商业银行科层经理人的激励方式上存在重短期绩效轻长期发展的倾向,没有充分考虑到资产收益的时滞性与经理人有限任期的矛盾,导致科层经理人片面追求短期经营效益,一些长期研发、系统性投入因见效慢、时滞长、三五年内不一定有显著成效而被经理人们忽略。本文将银行前期的时滞性的资产状况加入到新任经理人的激励契约中,发现:短期看能明显降低风险成本、激励成本和总代理成本,长期看能促使管理层将自己利益与银行长期经营绩效联系起来,保持长期较高水平的努力,促进银行资产保值增值。据此提出的契约设计方法,应该能解决资产收益时滞性与经理人任职短期性的冲突,建立对经理人绩效的长效考评、激励机制。

At present,branch manager＇s incentive mechanism of state-owned banks incline to emphasize on the short-term performance rather than long-term development,without fully considering the contradictions between time-lagging of assets income and manager＇s limited tenure,resulting in the quick return branch managers are eager to get,ignoring long-term investment.The paper adds the factors of capital with time-lagging yield to the incentive contract of new branch managers.Consequently,it is found that in short term,it could obviously reduce risk costs,incentive costs and general agency costs;in long term,it promote management layers combine their own interests with long-term interests of the banks to make harder efforts so as to facilitate maintaining and increasing of bank assets.Thus,the contract designing should be able to solve the conflicts between time-lagging of assets income and short term tenure to set up long term appraising and incentive mechanism.