收益控制权意义下产—供—销供应链激励机制

Incentive mechanism of production-supply-sales supply chain viewed from benefit disposal right

为提高供应链的运作绩效,针对一个制造商、一个批发商和一个零售商构成的供—产—销供应链,分析了成员企业间的委托代理关系,建立了收益控制权意义下的委托代理激励契约模型。基于该模型,获得了不同信息属性(对称和非对称)状态下的最优激励契约。收益控制权是委托人和代理人之间利益协调的一个重要因素,通过最优激励契约确定了委托人和代理人的最优收益控制权范围。供应链成员企业通过最优激励和最优收益控制权,实现了自身期望利润效用的最大化,提高了产—供—销供应链的运作能力和绩效。

To improve operation performance of supply chain, the principal-agent relationships between enterprises in a production-supply-sales supply chain involving a producer, a wholesaler, and a retailer was analyzed. From the perspective of benefit disposal right, a principal-agent incentive contract model was constructed. Based on this model, the optimal incentive contracts under symmetric and asymmetric information were obtained. The benefit disposal right was an important factor to coordinate the revenue of the principal and that of the agents. By means of the opti- mal incentive contracts, scope of the optimal benefit disposal right of both the principal and the agents were determined. Enterprises in the supply chain could maximize their expected benefit utility via the optimal incentive and the optimal benefit disposal right, thus the operation capability and performance of the production-supply-sales supply chain were improved.