最终控制人性质、审计行业专业性与控股股东代理成本--来自我国上市公司的经验证据

Controller's Characteristic,Audit Industry Specialization and Agency Costs of Controlling Shareholders——Evidence from Chinese listed companies

本文以我国2001—2008年上市公司为研究对象,对审计行业专业性与控股股东代理成本的相关关系进行了探讨。研究发现:审计行业专业性具有降低控股股东代理成本的作用;考虑最终控制人性质因素后,在非政府控制的上市公司中,审计行业专业性降低控股股东代理成本的作用更为明显;结合考虑两权分离度因素的影响,在非政府控制的上市公司中,审计行业专业性对控股股东代理成本的约束作用随着两权分离度的提高而增强,但在政府控制的上市公司,两权分离度、审计行业专业性与控股股东代理成本相关性并不明显。

This paper select China＇s listed companies as the research object from 2001 to 2008,and discussed the relation between audit industry specialization and agency costs of controlling shareholders.The results showed that auditing industry specialization can cut agency cost of controlling shareholders.Considering controller＇s characteristic,the study further finds that the listed companies in non-governmental control,audit industry specialization cut agency costs of controlling shareholders significantly.Taking the rights separation coefficient into consideration,we found that the audit industry specialization constraint controlling agency costs of shareholders with increased enhancement of rights separation coefficient from the listed company in non-governmental control,but the relation between audit industry specialization and agency costs of controlling shareholders was not significant from the listed company in governmental control.