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全流通条件下中国上市公司大股东行为:一个数理分析框架 被引量:3

A Mathematical Analysis of a Listed Company's Large Shareholder's Behavior under the Condition of Full Circulation
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摘要 以市净率股票估值理论为基础,在综合考虑大股东的"隧道行为"、"支撑行为"以及二级市场交易行为后建立大股东收益函数,并在此基础上详细分析全流通条件下大股东的行为变化,由此得出的结论是:全流通后,大股东将会谋求通过二级市场交易获取资本利得收益;大股东的持股比例、上市公司的盈利能力以及成长性、股票价格偏离其真实价值的大小、监管部门的监管程度以及大股东未来增持或减持股份的比例大小都将对大股东的"隧道行为"、"支撑行为"以及市场交易行为产生影响。 Based on the stock evaluation model of PBV,a large shareholder's profit function is established through a comprehensive consideration of the large shareholder's tunneling behavior,propping behavior and trade behavior in the secondary stock market.And then a detailed analysis of changes in the large shareholder's behavior under the condition of full circulation is made.It is considered that the large shareholder will seek his income of capital gains through trading in the secondary stock market after full circulation.The large shareholder's tunneling behavior,propping behavior and trade behavior in the secondary stock market will be affected by his shareholding proportion,profitability and growth of listed companies,degree of deviation between stock price and its real value,degree of supervision,and share proportion which the large shareholder will purchase or sell in future.
出处 《华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第3期121-128,155,共8页 Journal of East China Normal University(Humanities and Social Sciences)
基金 教育部人文社会科学基金项目(08JA790043)的阶段性成果
关键词 上市公司 大股东行为 收益函数 资本利得 large shareholder,profit function,capital gains
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共引文献93

同被引文献40

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