利益相关者与股利政策:代理冲突与博弈

Stakeholders and Dividend Policy:Perspective of Agency Conflict and Game

本文以股权分置改革为背景,利用2004—2008年中国上市公司经验数据,从代理冲突和博弈的角度分析了利益相关者与股利政策之间的关系。研究表明,我国上市公司利益相关者各方在股利分配上存在政策博弈现象。博弈的结果表现为具有控股股东的公司比其他公司具有更高的现金股利支付率;具备再融资条件的公司比其他公司具有更高的现金股利支付率;第一大股东参与管理的程度越低,现金股利的支付率越高,但这一特征并不显著。同时,在股权分置改革后,我国上市公司存在少分现金股利的倾向。

This paper made analysis on relationship between stakeholders and dividend policy in the context of share splitting from agency conflict and game perspective,based on a sample of listed companies ranging from 2004 to 2007 in China.Studies have shown that,there exists phenomenon of policy game in the dividend distribution policy among stakeholders of China＇s listed companies.And the results of the game shows that the lower level the first major shareholders participating in management,the higher the rate of payment of cash dividends;companies which have a controlling shareholder have higher cash dividend payout ratio than that of other companies;companies with re-financing conditions have higher cash dividend payout ratio than that of other companies.At the same time,after share splitting reform,China＇s listed companies tend to a smaller share cash dividend,but this tendency is not significant.