摘要
大多数委托-代理模型,都假设"委托人风险中性,代理人风险规避";而有关风险偏好参与人的激励问题,研究极少。将风险偏好参与人纳入委托-代理问题中,讨论委托人风险偏好/风险中性/风险规避,与代理人风险偏好/风险中性/风险规避互相组合的九种不同情况下的最优激励契约问题,并对有关结论进行对比分析。
Most models of principle-agent are based on the hypothesis that the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk aversive.There is little research on players＇ risk preference and incentive.Considering participants＇ risk preference,we discuss the optimal incentive mechanism of nine models-the combination of the principal＇s risk aversion,risk neutral and risk aversion with the agent＇s risk aversion,risk neutral and risk aversion.Comparison is finally made on the conclusions drawn from the analysis.
出处
《系统工程》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2011年第3期113-116,共4页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872064)
关键词
信息经济学
委托-代理
最优激励
风险态度
Information Economics
Principle-agent
Optimal Incentive
Attitude to Risk
