保险公司偿付能力风险信息对称性与市场供求

The symmetric information of solvency risks and its impacts on insurance demand and supply

保险公司偿付能力充足性是保险监管的内容之一,但是这一信息却往往不被投保人所获知,造成保险供给(保险公司)和保险需求(投保人)两方信息的不对称。本文以保险公司存在偿付能力风险为基本假定,以累积性预期理论和风险调整资本收益率构建保险需求和供给模型,分析在信息对称条件下和信息不对称条件下保险需求的变化及其对保险供给和保险公司盈利能力的影响。通过分析得出,当偿付能力信息不对称时保险市场会出现市场失灵,导致投保人利益受损和保险公司缺少降低偿付能力风险的动机。因此,加强保险偿付能力监管,并且降低保险公司与投保人之间的信息不对称性是提高保险市场效率的有效途径。

The solvency adequacy is one of the key issues of insurance regulation ,but this information is normally not accessible to the policyholders. This fact results in the asymmetric information between the insurer and the poli- cyholders. Our research takes the assumption that insurance companies are facing with solvency risks. Accordingly, we create the insurance demand and supply models according to the cumulative prospect theory （CPT） and Return On Risk Adjusted Capital （RORAC）. The purpose is to analyze the changes of insurance demand under two differ- ent situations of symmetric and asymmetric information and their influences on insurance supply and the profitability of the insurance companies. The results of our research show that under the situation of asymmetric information, it would cause market failures and the interests of the policyholders would be injured, and the insurance companies would lose their motivation to reduce their solvency risks. Therefore, strengthening the supervision of the insurance solvency risks and reducing the asymmetric information between insurers and policyholders are the effective paths to enhance the efficiency of the insurance market.