中国上市公司自愿业绩预告动机研究

The Management Earnings Forecast Incentives in China

随着业绩预告制度的实施和演进,我国资本市场上逐步出现了越来越多的上市公司自愿业绩预告,这对于缓解管理层与投资者、机构投资者与中小投资者之间的信息不对称具有重要意义。那么,是什么因素激励上市公司管理层自愿披露业绩预告？通过借鉴西方的自愿信息披露理论,并结合我国转轨经济的制度背景,本文提出了我国上市公司自愿业绩预告的三类动机：资本市场交易、管理层股票收益和管理层能力信号传递,并以2001-2008年我国上市公司业绩预告数据为研究样本对此进行了检验。研究结果显示,融资需求高、管理者利益协同程度高、会计业绩好的上市公司更有动机自愿披露业绩预告,并且国有相对于非国有上市公司自愿披露动机更弱。

Management earnings forecasts provide useful information to investors.Such forecasts represent one of the key disclosure mechanisms by which managers establish or alter outside earnings expectations,preempt litigation concerns,and influence firms＇ reputation. Management earnings forecasts are influential;they have been shown to affect stock prices and analysts＇ forecasts in the context of developed markets. The earnings forecast system is not established until 1998 in China.The system requires firms that are expected to report losses,turn loss to profit,or have dramatic earnings changes （up or down 50%）to make earnings preannouncements.However,some firms that are required to make earnings preannouncement did not do so.At the same time,some firms that are not required to disclose voluntarily make earnings preannouncements.What are the incentives for firms to make voluntary earnings forecast in China？ Literature documents five major motivations of management voluntary earnings forecasts based on the context of developed stock market;capital market transaction,CEO stock compensation, litigation risk,proprietary costs,and management power signaling.Do managers in China stock market have the same motivations as their counterparts in developed markets to make voluntary management disclosures？ Using data of earnings preannouncements by Chinese listed firms from 2001 to 2008,we find three incentives of voluntary management earnings forecast in China：capital market transaction,CEO stock compensation,and management power signaling.Specifically speaking, we find that firms with higher external financing need,better performance,and highly stock option-motivated managers are more likely to voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts; state-owned firms are less likely to voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts. Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways.First,it provides empirical evidence of management earnings forecast incentives for Chinese listed firms.Second,it also provides evidence on the mitigation effect of manager stock compensation to the disclosure agency problem.Finally,we provide evidence that political interferences affect management earnings forecast behavior.